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MARRYING OUTI AND LOSS OF STATUS:
THE CHARTER AND NEW INDIAN ACT
LEGISLATION
Peter Kirby*
Jeanette Lavell lost Indian status by virtue of section 12(l)(b) of
the Indian Act 2 which states that an Indian woman who marries a
person who is not an Indian is "not entitled to be registered" or in
common parlance, loses status. In her appeal to the Supreme Court
of Canada she argued violation of section (1)(b) of the Canadian
Bill of Rights3 - the right to equality before the law. In his
dissenting judgement Justice Laskin, as he then was, termed the
effect of section 12(l)(b)4 "a statutory excommunication." 5 The
majority upheld the section in question and proclaimed the law in
Canada; but four years later, Sandra Lovelace, another
excommunicant, brought her case to the United Nations Human
Rights Committee.6 The "views" of the Committee supported
Sandra Lovelace. 7 The Committee found a violation of Article 27
of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights which
reads:
Article 27
"In those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic
Peter Kirby is a lawyer and is Director of the Kenora
Community Legal Clinic. c 1985 Copyright in this article
remains with the author.
1. This term is taken from Jamieson, Indian Women and The
Indian Act: Citizens Minus (1978) at 30.
2. R.S.C. 1970, c. 106.
3. R.S.C. 1970, Appendix II.
4. Supra, note 2.
5. Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell (1973), 38 D.L.R. (3d),
481; [19741 S.C.R. 1349, at 509.
6. "Communication to the United -Nations Human Rights
Committee from Sandra Lovelace" in Selected Documents in
the Matter of Lovelace versus Canada Pursuant to the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, (New
Brunswick Human Rights Commission, 1981) at 24.
7. "Views of the Human Rights Committee", Id., at 154.
c 1985 Copyright in this article remains with the author.
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minorities exist, persons belonging to such minorities
shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own
culture, to profess and practice their own religion, or to
use their own language."
8
The Committee expressed its 'views' in the following words:
"15 ... [n] the opinion of the Committee the rights of
Sandra Lovelace to access to her native culture and
language "in community with the other members" of her
group, has in fact been, and continues to be interfered
with, because there is no place outside the Tobique
Reserve where such a community exists."
17... The case of Sandra Lovelace should be considered
in the light of the fact that her marriage to a non-
Indian has broken up. It is natural that in such a
situation she wishes to return to the environment in
which she was born, particularly as after the dissolution
of her marriage her main cultural attachment again was
to the Maliseet band. Whatever may be the merits of
the Indian Act in other respects, it does not seem to the
Committee that to deny Sandra Lovelace the right to
reside on the reserve is reasonable or necessary to
preserve the identity of the tribe." 9
Section 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms1 0
guarantees equality "before and under the law" and the equal
protection and benefit of the law. There may be qualifications to
this right particularly as it applies to Indian people.1 1 Section
1512 itself in subsection two sets out a built-in limit. Laws which
have the object of ameliorating the condition of individuals or
8. United Nations General Assembly Resolution 2220A (XXI),
Dec. 16, 1966 (Entry into force March 23, 1976).
9. Supra, note 6, at 163-164. '
10. Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms: Part I (ss.1 to 34)
of the Constitution Act, 1982 (Canada Act 1892, c.ll (U.K.),
Schedule B).
11. Id., Section 25 provides that the Chartd guarantees shall not
be interpreted to "abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal
treaty or other rights or freedoms".., of aboriginal peoples.
Section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 recognizes and
affirms "existing aboriginal and treaty rights".
12. Supra, note 10.
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groups disadvantaged by reasons of "race, national or ethnic origin,
colour, religion", or "sex" are not "precluded" by subsection one1 
-
The Conservative government has pre-empted the need for a
searching analysis of section 12(1)(b) 1 4 or other Indian Act 1 5 status
or membership sections by passing legislation, Bill C-31,16
intended to bring the membership and status provisions of the Act
in line with the section 15(1)17 equality guarantee. It is submitted
that the legislation will not stifle dissent or Charter challenges.
It is the purpose of this article to examine the meaning of
"equality" as taught by such cases as Laveltt 8 and Blisst 9 and to
make a humble prediction of the effect of this legacy on the
judicial interpretation of section 1520 as it might apply to the
Indian Act 2 1 amendments. 2 2 In so doing, we will touch briefly on
the possible effects of the Indian rights provisions of the Charter
and the Constitution. 2 3 It is hoped that this will add a real
dimension to what otherwise might be an abstract analysis of
patently discriminatory legislation (both as to group - Indians, and
as to individuals - women).
Although others2 4 have written much on the meaning of "equality
before the law" as that phrase has been interpreted by courts
13. Ibid.
14. Supra, note 2.
15. Ibid.
16. An Act to Amend the Indian Act 33-34 Eliz. II, 1984-85
(Can.), Bill C-31. (Deemed in force as of April 17, 1985 - S.
23)
17. Supra, note 10.
18. Supra, note 5.
19. (1978), 92 D.L.R. (3d) 417 (S.C.C.).
20. Supra, note 10.
21. Supra, note 2.
22. Supra, note 17.
23. Supra, note 10.
24. Matas, "Indian Women's Rights" (1974), 6 Man. L.J. 195.
McDonald, "Equality Before the Law and the Indian Act: In
Defence of the Supreme Court" (1977), 3 Dalhousie L.J. 726.
M'Gonigle, "The Bill of Rights and the Indian Act: Either?
Or?" (1977), 15 Alta. L.R. 292. "Katz, the Indian Act and
Equality Before the Law" (1973), 6 Ottawa L.R. 277.
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examining Indian drinking rights2 5 and the rights to registration or
status2 6 , the question of Indian status, its rights and disabilities
when examined in light of section 15,27 remains largely unexplored
territory.
It is perhaps unfortunate that what we know about "equality" as a
legal guarantee derives from cases which have dealt with the civil
and criminal disabilities of Indians. Indians have always been
treated as a special class of people having a unique relationship
with the federal government. Not only do Indian people have a
constitutional status by virtue of the "Indian power" 2 g but their
treaty and aboriginal rights have been given this same status.
2 9
The uniqueness of the position of the status Indian and the lack of
much more extensive judicial elaboration of the rights and
disabilities of Indian status makes examination of special legis-
lation like the Indian Act 3 0 difficult.
24. (1974), 38 Sask. L.R. 243; "Indian Act and The Canadian Bill
of Rights" (1974), 60sgoode Hall L.R. 397; "The Bill of
Rights and Indian Status" (1972), 7 U.B.C. L.R. 81. The focus
to date has been on the guarantee of treaty and aboriginal
rights. See Slattery, "The Constitutional Guarantee of
Aboriginal and Treaty Rights" (1983), 8 Queen's L.J. 232;
McNeil, "The Constitutional Rights of the Aboriginal Peoples
of Canada (1982), 4 Sup. Ct. L.R. 255. And Lysky, "The
Rights and Freedoms of the Aboriginal Peoples of Canada" in
Tarnopolsky and Beaudoin eds., The Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms (1982) 467.
25. R. v. Drybones (1969), 9 D.L.R. (3d) 473 (S.C.C.); [1970]
S.C.R. 282. See also R. v. Hayden (1984) C.N.L.R. in which
the Manitoba Court of Appeal declared inoperative section
97(b) of the Indian Act which prohibits intoxication on an
Indian reserve (irrespective of place or person). As in
Drybones this court applied section l(b) of the Bill of Rights.
26. Attorney General of Canada v. Lavell, supra, note 5.
27. Supra, note 10.
28. Constitution Act, 1867, 30-31, Victoria C. 3 (U.K.), s.91(24):
"Indians and Lands Reserved for Indians". See Lysyk, "The
Unique Constitutional Position of the Canadian Indian"
(1967), 45 Can. Bar. Rev. 513.
29. Constitution Act, 1982, supra, note 10, s.35.
30. Spra, note 2.
Marrying Out and Loss of Status
In Attorney General of Canada v. Canard3 ' the Supreme Court of
Canada examined the alleged discriminatory effect of sections of
the Indian Act 3 2 allowing the Minister of Indian Affairs to appoint
an administrator of a deceased Indian's estate. In upholding the
challenged provision, Mr. Justice Beetz stated:
The principle of equality before the law is generally
hostile to the very nature of status and it is no easy
task to reconcile the two in Canada when the one is
enshrined in a quasi-constitutional statute and the other
forms part of the fundamental law of the land. This the
Courts have attempted to do in Drybones and Lavell."
3 3
In Lavell, 3 4 Mr. Justice Ritchie established a test for equality
which has influenced all other decisions concerning the Canadian
Bill of Rights and which will continue to influence the interpre-
tation of section 15.35
The "right of the individual to equality before the law", said
Mr. Justice Ritchie, meant "equality in the administration or
enforcement of the law before the ordinary courts of the land".3 6
Mr. Justice Ritchie found that section 12(1)(b) of the Indian Act 3 7
which effects a loss of status 3 8 for a status Indian woman who
marries a non-status male did not meet the test. He made a
31. (1975), 52 D.L.R. (3d) 548.
32. Supra, note 2.
33. Supra, note 29 at 549.
34. Supra, note 5.
35. Supra, note 10.
36. Supra, note 5 at 499.
37. Supra, note 2.
38. More precisely s.12(l)(b) results in loss of "entitlement to be
registered" as an Indian. This could be followed by an order
of enfranchisement (more about which see infra page 88)
under section 109 which denies thi woman the right to be
considered "Indian" for the purposes of "any law". A distinc-
tion can be drawn between the effect of loss of status and
enfranchisement. Although what rights flow from this inter-
mediate "status" are not clear, the federal government has
made no orders of enfranchisement in respect to women
"marrying out" since 1975. See Jamieson, supra, note 1 at 65.
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distinction between Drybones 39 where an Indian person was sub-
ject to a criminal penalty to which no other Canadians were
subject, and a law regulating the civil rights of Indians - the right
to the use and benefit of reserve lands.4 U It could be inferred from
LaveU4 1 that "the regulation of the internal domestic life of
Indians on reserves" 4 2 was immune from a Bill of Rights challenge.
In Bliss v. the Attorney General of Canada 4 3 the Supreme Court of
Canada examined a Bill of Rights "equality before the law"
challenge by a woman denied ordinary benefits under the
Unemployment Insurance Act 4 4 because she was pregnant. In this
case, Mr. Justice Ritchie, again found no inequality of treatment.
From Lavell4 5 and Bliss 4 6 it could be said that schemes setting up
entitlement to beneTitswhether they be the use of reserve land or
unemployment insurance, are immune from "judicial review" so
long as the government in enacting the schemes can be said to be
pursuing a "valid federal objective". 4 7 In Lavell, 4 8 the objective
was the discharging of obligations to manage and control Indian
lands; in Bliss,4 discharging an obligation under section 91(24) of
the Constitution Act, 1867.Ou
In Light of the Charter: Section 15 Alone
Does the existence of the "Indian power"51 then remove govern-
ment decisions in relation to Indians from review under section
39. Supra, note 23.
40. Supra, note 5 at 498.
41. Id.
42. Id., at 498.
43. §Supa note 19.
44. 1971, 1970-71-72 (Can.), c.48.
45. Supra, note 5.
46. Supra. note 19.
47. d, at 424.
48. Supra, note 5.
49. Supra, note 19.
50. Supra, note 10.
51. Ibid.
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15?52 According to one author who defends the result in Laven,
5 3
"[To] sustain a law under section 91(24) is to find that it
treats Indians with precisely that discrimination which
their unique constitutional status makes
appropriate.. .,54
According to another, the "strict scrutiny" test which the
American Courts apply to legislation based on race is in the
Canadian context, "untenable".5 5 It is submitted that whatever
the precise meaning of the equality guarantees in section 15,56 the
Canadian Courts could be expected to hold the Indian Act 5 7
immune from Charter challenge, unless, as might be the case with
regard to status and membership rights, no reasonable justification
could be given for gender based exclusion, for example, of female
status Indians who "marry out". Although section 12(l)(b)57a has
been repealed57 band women who marry out no longer lose
status, 5 (c it may be useful to look at a Charter challenge to this
provision. To borrow the reasoning of Mr. Justice McIntyre in
Mackay v. R., 5 8 an inquiry on a section 1559 challenge might have
gone as follows:
1) Is there any inequality created by section 12(l)(b) 6 0 between
male and female status Indians?
2) Is it created in pursuit of a valid federal objective?
52. §pra, note 10.
53. §ura, note 5.
54. McDonald, supra, note 22.
55. Gold, "A Principled Approach to Equality Rights: A
Preliminary Inquiry" (1982), 4 Sup. Ct. L. Rev. 131 at 149.
See also Tarnopolsky, "The Equality Rights In The Canadian
Charter of Rights and Preedoms" (1983), 61 Can. Bar. Rev.
242.
56. Supra, note 10.
57. Supra, note 2.
57a. Indian Act, supra, note 2.
57b. Bill C-31. supra, note 16.
57c. See infra, pp. 92-93.
58. (1980), 114 D.L.R. (3d) 393; [1980] S.C.R. 370 at 423 (D.L.R.).
59. Supra, note 10.
60. Indian Act, supra, note 2.
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3) Has it been created rationally, not arbitrarily or
capriciously?
Under the Charter61 we might have to add the following additional
tests:
4) Is the inequality saved by section 15(2)62 as part of an
ameliorative law?
5) Is the inequality a "reasonable limit" in a free and democratic
society within the meaning of section 163 of the Charter?
Applying this analysis to Lavell,6 4 it is clear that Jeanette Lavell's
marriage to a non-status person triggered a loss of "benefit of the
law". She lost status. A male status Indian marrying a non-status
female would not. There can be no question that the membership
provisions of the Act are, however, seeking to obtain a "valid
federal objective" - the determination of those entitled to use and
benefit of Indian lands.
It is difficult to know whether section 12(1)(b) 6 5 is "rational". The
Canadian government in its submission to the United Nations
Committee in the Lovelace" Communication 6 6 defended the
legislation as protecting Indian lands from encroachment by white
men in "a basically farming economy". 6 7 The government further
argued that Indians used partileneal family relationships to deter-
mine legal claims not blood quantum. 6 8 Other arguments were




64. Supra, note 5.
65. Supra, note 2.
66. "Response of the Government of Canada to the Decision of
the Human Rights Committee: in Selected Documents,
supra, note 6 at 45.
67. Id.
68. This was not the case amongst the tribes of the Six Nations.
See Sanders, "Indian Women: A Brief History of Their Roles
and Rights" (1975), 21 McGill L.J. 656 at 657. In any case it
is questionable whether kinship rather than blood quantum
should determine status. In one of the briefs to the
Committee submitted on behalf of Lovelace a scheme was
suggested which would grant status to one who embraced
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membership rules and that before changing the law, the govern-
ment would have to examine the effects on the Indian
community.
6 9
Assumin.g the government's rationale were accepted, is section
12(l)(b)I u legislation ameliorating the condition of a disadvantaged
group? The whole of the early Indian Acts7 1 were based on a
policy of enfranchisement by which Indians, on becoming owners of
land in fee simple would attain full citizenship, including the right
to vote. 7 2  A dependent status was recognized at the very
beginning. To day, however, enfranchisement instead of conferring
a higher status results in a loss of rights and benefits as will be
outlined below. With respect to the "reasonable limit" test, it is
submitted that this may form part of the "rational connection"
analysis under the third head of inquiry.
A similar analysis could be applied to all the status and member-
ship provisions of the Indian Act. 7 3 Two principles underlie the
former, pre C-31, rules of status: transmission of status through
the male line and kinship rather than blood quantum. The following
persons were entitled to be registered:
1) All Indians who were recognized as such in 1874;
74
2) All Indians who were members of bands who signed treaties
after 1874;
75
3) All male descendants of those persons described in one and
two;7 6
68. Indian society and culture. (Selected Documents, supra. note
3 at 130). In fact the early pieces of Indian legislation
adopted similar definitions. See Jamieson, supra, note 1 at 5.
Also see Sanders, "Indian Status: A Women's Issue or An
Indian Issue? n (1984] C.N.L.R. 30 at 35-36.
69. Supra, note 66 at 46-47.
70. Indian Act, supra, note 2.
71. Jamieson, supra, note 1 at 27 and 44.
72. The federal franchise did not come until 1960. See Bartlett,
"Citizens Minus Indians and the Right to Vote" (1980), 44
Sask. L.Rev. 163.
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4) All legitimate children of males described in three;7 7
5) All illegitimate male children of males described in three;7 8
6) All illegitimate children of females described in one, two and
four 7 9 (subject to rule eight below);
7) All women married to male persons in any of the categories
described above; 8 0
The following persons lost status:
8. Illegitimate children of females against whom a protest was
made;
8 1
77. Id., s.1 l(l)(d).
78. This rule results from a statutory interpretation of s.ll(l)(c).
In Martin v. Chapman (1983) 150 D.L.R. (3d) 638, [19831 2
C.N.L.R. 76, the Supreme Court of Canada decided that
illegitimate male children were entitled to be registered (i.e.
to have status). The anomaly in this approach is highlighted
by Re Froman, (1973) 2 O.R. 360 at 366 (Ont. Co. Ct.)
where His Honour Judge Fanjoy stated:
"In my opinion, s.ll(1)(c) has reference only to
male legitimate children. It therefore follows that
there is no difference under the Indian Act
between an illegitimate child of a male Indian and
illegitimate child of a female Indian when the
other parent is a non-Indian, subject, of course, to
the fact that there is the right of protest contained
in s.12(2) of the Act which applies only to the
illegitimate child of a female person and has no
application to the illegitimate child of a male
person.
In my opinion, the provision for protest contained
in s.12(2) is not discrimination on the basis of sex.
The fact that the protest procedure is available
with respect to paternity and not with respect to
maternity is simply recognition of the facts of life.
Maternity is always identifiable. Paternity always
has a degree of uncertainty, even for legitimate
issues. No Legislature can change the fundamental
biological difference between men and women."
79. Id., s.l l(l)(e).
80. Id., s.l l(l)(f).
81. Id. s.12(2).
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9) All persons twenty-one years of age whose mother and whose
father's mother were not persons described in one to six
above. This is called the "double mother rule". It excluded
children of less than one quarter "Indian" (by kinship). For
example, if the child's grandmother and mother gained status
by marriage to a status Indian, the child would lose status.
This has little to do with blood quantum because a pure blood
Indian may. in fact, not have status at birth but gain it by
marriage;82
10) All status female Indians who "married out";8 3
11) All persons who gave up status or enfranchised. 8 4 The policy
behind the Indian Act 8 in terms of "raising status" is clearly
seen in section 109(1) which read:
"109.() On the report of the Minister that an Indian has
applied for enfranchisement and that in his opinion the
Indian
a) is of the full age of twenty-one years,
b) is capable of assuming the duties and
responsibilities of citizenship, and
c) when enfranchised, will be capable of supporting
himself and his dependants,
the Governor in Council may by order declare that the
Indian and his wife and minor unmarried children are
enfranchised."
8 6
The grounds for equality challenges seem fairly evident: discrimin-
ation between adult males and females; discrimination between
82. Id., s.12(1)(a)(iv).
83. Id.. s.12(l)(b).
84. Id., s.109-113. A review of the various pieces of legislation
providing for membership and loss of status is contained in
Jamieson, supra, note 1, chapters 5 through 11. For a good
summary of the status question prior to Martin v. Chapman
(supra, note 78), see Imai and Laird "The Indian Status
Question: A Problem of Definitions" (1982), 5 Canadian
Legal Aid Bulletin 113.
85. Supra, note 2.
86. Ibid. Section 109 was repealed by Bill C-31, s. 19, supa, note
16.
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male and female children; discrimination between legitimate and
illegitimate children and further between illegitimate male and
illegitimate female children of status males.
Restoration of Status
Bill C-3187 which amends the Indian Act 8 8 provides a resolution of
outstanding section 1589 issues, by repealing rules nine and ten
above. It also introduces for the first time, the concept of band
control of membership. The Bill does away with the principle of
transmission of status through the male line and institutes a one-
quarter kinship rule - excluding second generation children of
mixed status/non-status marriages. Thus a child who is fifty
percent status (who has one non-status parent) can transmit status
only by marrying another person who has status. Those who have
lost status by reason of rules 8, 9 or 10 above would have their
status restored9 0 and "marrying out" no longer triggers loss of
status. The double mother rule is replaced by the fifty percent
kinship rule and distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate
children, whatever the gender of child or parent, are eliminated. 9 1
The most dramatic change, however, is the recognition of band
control over membership . A distinction must be made between
87. Supra, note 16.
88. Supra, note 2.
89. Supra, note 101
90. Id., s.6(l)(c). The previous Liberal government proposal, Bill
C-47 is analyzed in terms of the views of Indian peoples and
proposals for self government by Sanders, supra, note 57. An
essential difference between the two bills is that the Liberal
government would have determined future transmission of
status by a one quarter descent rule with a one half descent
rule to be applied to children of those reinstated. In addition,
there was no provision for band control of membership.
The proposed Amendments in Bill C-31 would also return
status to children of women marrying out who had lost status
by order of the Minister under s.109(2); Indians who had
voluntarily given up status to secure employment; and Indians
who were automatically enfranchised without their consent
under sections of the Indian Act "as it read prior to July 1,
1920" by reason of their obtaining university degrees, or
becoming a professional person (s.6(l)(c), (d) and (e)).
91. Id., s.6(2), s.l(l).
92. Id., s.10-14.
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status, or entitlement to registration, and membership in a band.
Not all status Indians are members of bands. Sections five and six
of the Indian Act 9 3 establish lists, a general list of all status
Indians and band lists, containing the names of the members of the
various bands. Bands do not now have any general control
over membership criteria. However, since 1981 bands have, by
government invitation, been applying for exemption from rules nine
and ten above. Section four of the Indian Act 9 4 permitted
exemption by proclamation from certain parts of the Act. As of
February 22, 1985 of 582 bands across Canada, 312 had secured
proclamations of exemption from the effect of rule nine the
"double mother" rule and 107 from rule ten,9 5 section 12(l)(b).b6
Bill C-3196a establishes a two year period, June 28, 1985 to June
28, 1987, during which the following are entitled to band
membership:
1) persons formerly excluded under rules 8, 9 and 1097 above
and reinstated to status;
2) persons born after April 17, 1985, both of whose parents are
status band members.
9 8
On June 28, 198799 if a band has not established its own rules for
determining membership, the Department of Indian Affairs will
continue to maintain the band list and in addition to those persons
set out in one and two above, the following will be entered on band
lists:
3) persons born at any time both of whose parents are status;
10 0
4) persons born at any time, one of whose parents is a status
band member. 1 0 1
93. Supra, note 2.
94. Ibid.
95. L.G. Smith, Registrar, Indian Affairs, letter to the author,
February 22, 1985.
96. Indian Act, supra, note 2.
96a. Supra, note 16.
97. Id.., s. 1 l(1)(c).
98. Id., s.ll(l)(d).
99. Id.., s.1l (2).
100. Ibid.
101. Ibid.
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The effect of these rules is to allow band councils a two year
period to make membership codes which would prevent children
born prior to April 17, 1985, to those persons who have been
restored to status, from gaining band membership. The bands could
also exclude from membership, persons born at anytime, only one
of whose parents was status.
The Charter Revisited: In the Light of Sections 27 and 28
Questions under section 15102 will undoubtedly continue to arise.
First we will examine whether this section addresses the "real"
problems raised by the Lavelll0 3 ruling. Second, we will take a
look at possible Charter challenges to registration and membership
decisions.
In Lael 104 the Supreme Court examined the question of loss of
status without examining its consequences. This approach was
probably dictated by the abstract tool used by the court - a bill of
rights - and an unwillingness to examine the "wisdom" 1 0 5 of the
legislation - a reluctance which will, depending on one's point of
view, continue to cloud interpretation of the Charter. If we look
at Lavell 1 0 6 through the case of Sandra Lovelace,10V and examine
the consequences of loss of status we put into broad relief the
question of whether the Charter and particularly section 15108 can
satisfy Canada's obligations under the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights 10 9 and will meet continued challenges to
Indian Status and membership rules.
In Lavell, 1 1 0 the Supreme Court focused on loss of use and benefit
of reserve land; but did not deal with the consequences flowing
from Jeanette Lavell's loss of this benefit. Upon her marriage to a
non-status male, she lost a host of benefits aside from the right to
use and occupancy of reserve land. Status Indian people have the
102. Supra, note 10.
103. Supra, note 5.
104. Ibid.
105. Per Mr. Justice Ritchie in Bliss, supra, note 19 at 424.
106. Supra, note 5.
107. Supra, note 6.
108. Supra, note 10.
109. Supra, note 8.
110. Supra, note 5.
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following rights:
11 1
1) Use of reserve land;
1 12
2) Exemption from taxation and exemption from seizure of
personal and real property on reserves;
1 13
3) Access to various government funded housing and education
programs designed especially for native people;
1 1 4
4) The right to vote in band elections and stand for office;11 5
5) Exemption from the application of some provincial laws;
1 1 6
6) Generally if the person is part of a band which signed a
treaty,lI7 the right to yearly payments and special rights to
hunt and fish; and
7) A right to a per capita share in band assets.
1 1 8
Sandra Lovelace was born a status Indian and had lived on the
111. This list is adopted from that set out by Sanders in "The Bill
of Rights and Indian Status" (1972), 7 U.B.C.L.R. 89.
112. This right derives from the definition of a reserve as a piece
of land set apart "for the use and benefit of a band", band
membership and the rule that membership follows status
(Indian Act, supra, note 2 s.2(), s.l 1-15).
113. Indian Act, supra, note 2, s.29, s.89-90.
114. Jamieson, supra, note 1, at 70-71.
115. Indian Act, supra, note 8, s.75-77, Indian women did not gain
this right until 1951 (R.S.C. 1951, c.149).
116. Id., s.88. The application depends on the extent to which the
provincial law affects "Indianess" or the incidents of Indian
status. See for example on the issue of the application of
traffic laws, R. v. Twoyoungmen [1979] C.N.L.R. 85, 16, A.R.
413 (Alta. C.A.); (casenote by the author (1982), 5 Canadian
Legal Aid Bulletin 198); on child welfare laws Natural
Parents v. Superintendent of Child Welfare (1973), 60 D.L.R.
(3d) 148 (S.C.C.); and labour laws Four B Manufacturing Ltd.
v. United Garment Workers of America et al. (1979), 102
D.L.R. (3d) 385 (S.C.C.).
117. Band members whose ancestors were signatory to Treaty
Three obtain five dollars per year and the "right to pursue
their avocations of hunting and fishing throughout the tract
surrended": Treaty Three (Queen's Printer, Ottawa, 1966).
118. This right would "crystallize" upon enfranchisement. (Indian
Act, supra, note 8, s.15).
(1985), 1 J. L. Soc. Pol.
Tobique Reserve until her marriage in 1970.119 Her marriage had
broken up and she attempted to return to the reserve despite
opposition from band members. 1 2 0  Before the Human Rights
Committee, she argued violation of several sections of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: Article 12 -
mobility rights, Article 17 and 23 - the right to marry and
protection of the family, and Article 27 - the right to enjoy one's
culture, religion and language in community with other members of
a minority group.
12 1
The Commitee did not find it necessary to deal with any violation
but that of Article 27.122 It did not however deal directly with the
political and economic losses consequent on "marrying out". In
addition, the Committee stipulated that "to deny Sandra Lovelace
the right to reside on the reserve was not reasonable or necessary
to preserve the identity of the tribe". 1 2 3 It is submitted that the
Supreme Court of Canada will have to take this broad balancing of
interests approach in reviewing status or membership challenges
under the Charter. Challenges to the new legislation could come
from those who are of Indian blood or Indian by culture, demanding
equal treatment under section 15M24.
The courts will have to examine section 34125 of the Constitution,
which recognizes and affirms "aboriginal and treaty rights", section
25126 of the Charter which mandates that section 15127 must be
construed so as not to abrogate or derogate from any aboriginal or
treaty rights, or "other rights of freedoms that pertain to
aboriginal peoples" and section 28128 which guarantees all Charter
119. "Communication" and "Reply of Sandra Lovelace to the
Observations Made and Questions Posed by the 31 July 1980
Interim Decicion of the Human Rights Committee" in
Selected Documents, supra, note 6 at 147.
120. Id., at 148
121. Id., at 24 and 106.
122. "View of the Human Rights Commitee" in Selected
Documents supra, note 6 at 162.
123. Id., at 164
124. Supra, note 10.
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rights equally between males and females. It is interesting to note
that the former Prime Minister had suggested an amendment to
section 25129 to the effect that the section 25130 rights would not
derogate from the section 28131 guarantee.
13 2
Presumably, any argument justifying discrimination under the
status or membership rules would have to be framed in terms of
"aboriginal or treaty rights" or "other rights" of aboriginal peoples.
As the treaties are silent on status or membership, the argument
might be that the Indian Act 1 3 3 as amended1 3 4 creates rights
which can not be derogated from under a section 15135 challenge.
Alternatively, the rules might be defended as "ameliorative" under
section 15(2).136 In this respect, bands could argue the threat
posed to "tribal identity" as a result of a potential influx of new
members. This threat would take the form of increased pressures
on land, housing and services and of social and cultural tensions.
At least with respect to membership rules bands could argue a
"sovereign immunity" from court challenge.
However, neither sovereignty, self-determination or self-
government of Indian tribes or nations have been recognized in
Canadian law. An Indian band acts by power delegated to it under




132. Reported in Zolotkin, "The 1983 and 1984 Consitutional
Conference: Only the Beginning [1984] 3 C.N.L.R. 3 at 15;
and see Constitution Act, 1982, s.35, supra, note 10. By
amendment to the Act two constitutional conferences were
promised to discuss issues relating to the interpretation and
application of this and other sections which "directly affect
the aboriginal peoples of Canada". Treaty rights were
defined to include land claims and declared to apply equally
to male and female persons. Constitution Amendment
Proclamation, 1983, SI/84-102.
133. Supra, note 2.
134. Supra, note 16.
135. Ibid.
136. Supra, note 10.
137. Supra, note 2 and see Paul Bank v. R., (1984] C.N.L.R. 87, 2
W.W.R. 540. Belzil J.A. stated that "bands had no other
source of power" (at 549).
(1985), 1 J. L. Soc. Pol.
concerning a very limited number of subjects including control and
management of traffic, health needs, repair of roads, public games,
fish and game and more generally, "observance of law and
order". 1 3 8  It is not clear whether the power to control band
membership would also be a delegated power. Bill C-311 3 9 does
not provide a right of appeal to challenge membership decisions
made by bands. It does provide such a right in respect to decisions
made by the Department of Indian Affairs on questions of status or
membership. 1 4
0
In contrast to Canada, the United States recognizes Indian tribes as
"distinctly, independent political communities, retaining their
original natural rights".141 In Santa Clara Peublo v. Martinez
1 4 2
an Indian woman challenged loss of membership in her tribe
effected by a tribal law similar to s.12(1) (b).1 4 3 She had "married
out". The ruling, although affirming the concept of self
determination by Indian tribes was based on a procedural point.
The modified Bill of Rights which applies to Indian tribes provided
no remedy other than by wav of habeas corpus for violations of its
"equal protection" clause. 1 4 4 The Supreme Court determined that
this gave the tribe a "sovereign immunity" from civil suit. 1 4 5 In
Canada the question under the new law will be whether the
exclusion of appeal rights over band membership decisions in
conjunction with "natural rights" arguments under section 25 of the
Charter and section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 provide such
immunity.
The Relevance to Legal Clinics
Will legal clinics be at the forefront of Charter challenges to
Indian Act 1 4 6 legislation? Clinics will feel the tensions between
assertion of individual and collective rights in deciding whether to
make such challenges. Resolution will depend amongst other things
138. d., s.81.
139. Supra, note 16, s. 14.2(1)
140. Ibid.
141. Worcester v. Georgia 6 Pet. 515 (U.S.S. Ct. 1832)
142. 98 S. Ct. 1670 (1978)
143. Indian Act, supra, note 2.
144. Supra, note 142 at 1679.
145. Supra, note 142 at 1677.
146. Supra, note 2.
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on policies in respect to acting against band councils and the
availability of Legal Aid Certificates to the private bar. Clinics
will likely be asked to assist in documenting status claims. This
role would produce the least conflict with band councils. As it is
projected that 22,000 people will be eligible for restoration of
status and band membership and a further 46,000 first generation
children to status1 4 7 legal clinics whatever their location in
Ontario can expect some inquiries.
147. Background Notes: Removal of Discrimination From The
Indian Act (House of Commons, n.d.).
